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Effects of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on CEO Employment Risk 
Abstract 
This paper examines the determinants of CEO employment risk from a corporate 
governance (CG) perspective. Previous studies focused on the effect of CG on firm 
performance, we investigate the effect of CG on CEO’s employment risk. Using Probit 
model on a panel dataset from UK FTSE 350 non-financial companies, our results reveals 
that the likelihood of CEO employment risk increases as board size and board 
independence increases, while CEO network reduces the likelihood. The study 
advances CG literature by providing fresh insights into how CG mechanisms can 
enhance effective monitoring of CEO performance. It also offers important insight to 
policy makers who are interested in providing guidance on the optimal board size and 
board composition and those interested in the effective monitoring of CEO 
performance and organisational strategies for firm performance.  
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance has become a subject of intense scholarly debate. While some 
studies have focused on good corporate governance and its determinants (Adegbite, 2015), others 
have attempted to examine the effect of governance mechanisms on firm outcomes such as 
performance (Liu, Miletkov, Wei and Yang, 2015), risk taking (Nakano and Nguyen, 2012), 
investment decisions (Dong and Gou, 2010), financial reporting quality (Marra, Mazzola and 
Prencipe, 2011) amongst others. The emphasis of the extant literature has been to promote good 
corporate governance practices, by stressing the link to positive firm outcomes. There is however, 
the need to go beyond the effects of corporate governance on firm outcomes by examining the 
effects of corporate governance mechanisms on the personal risk of decision makers, such as 
company executives. This is important because executives are exposed to an inherent risk, arising 
from the close association of their compensation package with firm’s stock price (both the return 
and volatility). They are also exposed to diversification risk because of the huge amount of their 
firm based wealth. However, while the analysis of compensation risks is beginning to gain 
scholarly attention (Guay, 1999; Hayes, Lemmon and Qiu, 2012; Ju, Leland and Senbet, 2014), 
personal risks like employment risk that executives, such as CEOs, are exposed to, and their impact 
on firm outcomes have been almost neglected in the extant literature. We address this gap in this 
paper. This study therefore is the first to empirically examine how corporate governance 
mechanisms determine CEO employment risk.  
The corporate governance systems in an organisation are expected to play a role in 
determining the level of personal risk affecting the CEO. This is because the provisions of the 
system indirectly guide the decisions of the CEO. Thus, given the relationship between good 
corporate governance and firms’ decisions and outcomes, it is important to examine the 
determinants of CEO’s personal risk and the impact on firms’ decisions made and outcomes from 
a corporate governance perspective. In order to do this, we examine CEO employment risk. 
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) & Cruz, Gómez-Mejia, and Becerra (2010) note that employment 
risk is of great concern to executives. The employment risk of the CEO also has potential 
consequences for other firm outcomes such as risk taking and firm performance. For example, 
Chakraborty, Sheikh and Subramanian (2007) show that CEOs facing high termination risk engage 
in less risk taking activities. Whereas shareholders would prefer more risk taking which would 
improve firm performance. Similarly, Fiordelisi and Ricci (2014) find strong negative relationship 
between firm performance and CEO turnover. 
CEO employment risk refers to the possibility or likelihood of being dismissed from office 
before the expiration of the employment contract (Chakraborty et al., 2007). The actual removal 
of the CEO can result in serious consequences for the CEO such as loss of reputation, inability to 
find another job, and loss of future income (Larraza-Kintana, Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia and 
Welbourne, 2007). While the existing empirical literature points to firm performance as a major 
determinant of CEO dismissal (Kaplan and Mitton, 2012), the literature has failed to provide 
evidence of other determinants of CEO employment risk.  Adopting agency theory and resource 
dependency theory as our conceptual framework, this paper contributes to existing corporate 
governance literature by examining relevant corporate governance mechanisms as determinants of 
CEO employment risk. Specifically, this study aims to answer the question; does the structure of 
the board and the size of the CEO network/connections determine the CEO employment risk? To 
answer this question, we use data from BoardEx database and Datastream with a focus on non-
financial firms in the FTSE 350 index. We focus on the UK because corporate governance in the 
UK employs a prescriptive approach, where compliance with the codes of best practice is 
recommended with a requirement to disclose reasons for non-compliance. The FTSE 350 is a 
developed market with assessable information and as a result, findings of this study obtained can 
be compared with similar markets in the world. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows; 
section 2 presents the literature review and hypotheses development. Sections 3 and 4 present the 
data and model specification respectively. To confirm the validity of results we perform a 
robustness check and present the results in section 5. The last section, 6 discusses and concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. Literature and Hypotheses Development 
2.1. Theoretical Framework 
The agency theory suggests that due to the separation of the ownership of the firm from its control, 
there is the likelihood of a conflict of interest between owners and managers to the extent that the 
decisions of managers become self-serving, rather than for the interest of shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). To overcome this conflict of interest, agency theory perspectives suggest 
providing a monitoring mechanism to protect the interest of shareholders. One of such mechanism 
is the setting up of a board of directors. The board of directors is the highest decision making body 
of any corporate establishment. The board is charged with the responsibility to hire and fire CEOs 
as well as other executives. It is also the responsibility of the board to set the remuneration of the 
CEO. It is therefore expected that the board should be able to assess the performance of the CEO 
in relation to the firm’s performance. Hence going by the supposition of agency theory, an effective 
board should be one that is able to discipline CEOs if and when there is need to do so. Executives 
can be disciplined either by warning, pay-cut or outright dismissal.  
The literature on effective boards has taken different dimensions ranging from size (Adams 
and Mehran, 2005; Nakano and Nguyen, 2012), independence (O’Connell and Cramer, 2010; 
Chen, 2015), networks (Cashman, Gillan and Jun, 2012; Engelberg, Gao and Parsons, 2013), 
diversity (Adams, Terjesen, and Ees, 2015), busyness (Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard, 2003; 
Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) amongst others. While there is a vast literature on board size and 
independence, there is also a burgeoning research on board networks. Resource dependency theory 
highlights the importance of networks as a means to garner external resources that is beneficial to 
the firm, which otherwise would be difficult or costly to obtain. The implication of this is that such 
resources would lead to better firm performance which translates to low employment risk for 
executives. For instance, Jackling and Johl (2009) argue that large board’s increases performance 
because of the greater exposure to external recourses provided by the different board members. 
Similarly, Jermias and Gani (2014) provide evidence that outside directors are important source of 
external resources to the firm through human capital. They provide strong evidence that the 
positive relationship between managerial share ownership and performance is reinforced by the 
presence of outside directors. From gender diversity perspective, Luckerath-Rovers (2013) argues 
that firms with women on the board provide important resources by having better connections with 
important stakeholders, which results in better firm performance.  
While there is a general consensus that the main cause of CEO employment risk or actual 
dismissal is poor firm performance1, prior studies have failed to examine other determinants of 
CEO employment risk. It is against this backdrop that this study considers the effect of three 
governance mechanisms (board size, board independence and CEO network) on the CEO 
employment risk. As good corporate governance is beneficial to both shareholders and other 
stakeholders, there is therefore a strong reason to examine how the prescription of good 
governance visible in the form of board effectiveness in terms of structure and networks determine 
CEO employment risk. This is because these mechanisms may affect CEO employment risk which 
in turn may affect firm outcomes. 
2.2. Board Size 
The existing literature on the effectiveness of boards of directors and corporate governance codes 
of conduct do not provide a particular board number that is appropriate for any particular firm. For 
example, while some studies, (Adams and Mehran, 2005; Nakano and Nguyen, 2012) find that 
large boards have a positive effect on firms, some others (Yermack, 1996; Guest, 2009) find a 
negative effect. However, Jensen (1993) argues that an optimal board is one comprised of seven 
to eight members. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that smaller boards are more effective as 
decision making takes shorter time. Hence, Raheja (2005) suggest that an optimal board size is 
dependent on the functions of the directors as well as the firm specific features and needs. 
A significant body of research has examined the determinants of board size as well as its 
effect on firm outcomes. However, the implication of board size for the CEO employment risk has 
remained largely unexplored. For example, Chen and Al-Najjar (2012) in a recent study of Chinese 
firms observe that board size is mainly driven by the complexity of the firm. In the UK, Guest 
(2008) provides evidence that it is the advising needs of the firm that determine the size of the 
board. While for US firms, Linck, Netter and Yang (2008) observe that the structure of the board 
is determined by the anticipated cost and benefits of the monitoring and advising roles that boards 
tend to provide. Another dimension of the analysis of corporate board size is its implication for 
firm performance. This has resulted in divergent results. For instance, Yermack (1996) provides 
evidence of a negative relationship between board size and firm performance. The study reveals 
that large boards are usually plagued with communication and coordination problems as well as 
increased agency problems which results in lower firm performance.  
In examining a sample of small and medium size firms, Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells 
(1998) reveal that there is a significant negative relationship between board size and profitability. 
Similarly, Liang, Xu and Jirapon (2013), find that in a sample of the fifty largest banks in China, 
board size has a significant negative impact on firm performance. In the UK, Guest (2009) find 
that board size has negative effect on profitability, tobin’s Q and share returns. On the contrary, 
Adams and Mehran (2012) study the consequence of board structure on bank holding companies 
in the light of the latest financial crisis. The study shows that board size is positively associated 
with bank performance. Cheng (2008) examines the association between board size and the 
variability of corporate performance for US companies. The study provides evidence that larger 
boards have lower performance variability. The findings are linked to the idea that it takes much 
negotiation to reach an agreement within large boards. Hence, decisions made are less likely to be 
extreme, therefore lower performance variability. Similarly, Nakano and Nguyen (2012) find that 
Japanese firms with large boards, exhibit low performance variability as well as reduced risk of 
corporate failure. This is attributed to low cross-sectional variation in risk taking among Japanese 
firms. However, they note that this effect is not so significant for firms with huge investment 
prospects.  
Although most of the above studies concentrate mainly on the effect of board size on firm 
performance and the determinants of board size, an important, yet unexplored, consequence of 
board size is its effect on the CEO’s employment risk. We address this issue because the outcome 
of the firm (whether in terms of performance, mergers or acquisition, shareholders returns etc.), 
have potential effect on the employment of CEO. This is especially so in the case of large 
companies such as those in the FTSE 350 index. Also, we examine board size as a determinant of 
CEO employment risk because of the power vested on the board as the apex body in the firm. The 
board is saddled with the responsibility to hire and fire the executives of the firm which includes 
the CEO, (Biondi and Reberioux, 2012). The board of directors are also charged with the 
responsibility of monitoring and advising managers on behalf of shareholders, (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). We therefore argue that the structure of the board may have strong consequences 
for the job security of the CEO. In line with Yamack (1996) who suggests that large boards suffer 
from communication and coordination problems which intensifies agency costs and results in poor 
firm performance, we argue that this lower firm performance resulting from large boards will 
increase CEO employment risk. We propose that; 
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of CEO employment risk increases with firm’s board size  
2.3. Board Independence  
A second aspect of the board structure that has been frequently examined in the literature is the 
composition of the board. Although some studies have analysed the structure of the board with 
regards to its diversity in terms of culture and expertise, age, and gender, a vast majority have 
concentrated on the board independence as a determining factor in the functioning and 
performance of the firm. This is due to the increased call for better corporate governance 
mechanisms in corporations following incessant corporate governance crises. For example, in the 
UK, the Hampel report (1998) and Higgs report (2003) recommend that at least fifty percent of 
the company’s board be comprised of independent non- executive directors. In the US, the 
Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002 requires that majority of board members be comprised of 
independent directors and all audit committee members be independent directors. Also the Dodd-
Frank Act 2010 requires all members of the compensation committee be independent directors. 
No doubt, the recommendation of these corporate governance codes recognises the importance of 
independent boards, however, the effectiveness of this recommendation is however predicated on 
some factors. For example, Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010) notes that recent regulation on 
board independence will only be effective and result in better firm performance when the cost of 
information acquisition is low. They show that when information acquisition is high, corporate 
performance declines when more outside directors are added to the board. Similarly, Koerniadi 
and Tourani-Rad (2012) examine the effect of independent directors on firm value. They argue 
that in line with stewardship theory and in an environment where managers are active partners 
with stakeholders, fewer independent directors results in increased firm value. Thus, they conclude 
that board independence is of negative value to the firm. 
Koerniadi and Tourani-Rad (2012), O’Connell and Cramer (2010), Chen (2015), Lu and 
Wang (2015) and Liu et al., (2015) have all attempted to provide evidence of a relationship 
between board independence and various aspects of the firm with inconclusive results. For 
instance, Lu and Wang (2015) examine the influence of board independence on corporate 
investment decisions in the US. In line with the idea that independent board reduces agency 
problems, the study reveals that more independent boards have negative relationship with capital 
investment but positive relationship with investment in research and development. Similarly, Dong 
and Gou (2008) examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on a firms’ research and 
development (R&D) investment decision. They find that the number of independent outside 
directors has a positive impact on R&D investment (see also O’Connell and Cramer, 2010; Chen, 
2015; Liu et al., 2015).  
Some studies have toed a different line by investigating how board independence affects 
firm risk. For instance, Bradley and Chen (2015) analyse the effect of board independence on the 
cost of debt. They find that board independence reduces the cost of debt when there are stringent 
credit conditions and when leverage is low, but the reverse is the case when credit conditions are 
poor and when leverage is high. They concluded that more independent boards encourage more 
risk taking which is favourable to shareholders but not favourable to bondholders. In relation to 
corporate failure, Hsu and Wu (2014) study the effect of board structure on the possibility of 
corporate collapse in the UK. They particularly differentiated between grey directors and 
independent directors. The study emphasises the importance of having grey directors2  on corporate 
boards. The findings reveal that the possibility of corporate failure is lower for firms with higher 
proportion of grey directors when compared to independent directors. Hsu and Wu (2014) 
conclude that strict adherence to “independence” might not be beneficial to the firm. Similar results 
were observed in Wang and Hsu, (2013) & Chen, (2014). 
Recently, there has been an influx of research on earnings management. Executives of 
poorly performing firms tend to engage in earnings management through the use of accounting 
practices in order to bolster current profit. In accordance with the rationale for corporate 
governance codes and practices, it is expected that independent directors would object to such 
practices, so that there would be a negative relationship between board independence and earnings 
management. Indeed, Setia-Atmaja, Haman and Tanewski (2011) show that for Australian family 
controlled firms, a higher fraction of independent directors on the board (that is more independent 
boards) helps to curtail earnings management, see also Osma (2008). In a similar study, Marra et 
al., (2011) finds that more independent boards and the existence of the audit committee reduces 
earnings management after the mandatory adoption of IFRS. They conclude that corporate 
governance systems such as board independence help to improve earnings quality. Subsequently, 
Yekini, et al. (2015) examine the relationship between board independence and the quality of 
information disclosed in annual reports about community involvement. Their findings reveal that 
firms with higher board independence are likely to disclose more superior information on their 
community activities compared to less independent boards. Relatedly, Chen, Cheng and Wang 
(2015) note that increasing board independence does not necessarily deter earnings management 
but that a reduction in earnings management influenced by independent directors is conditioned 
on information acquisition cost.  
In relation to CEO turnover, Laux (2008) examines the effect of board independence on 
the CEO turnover. The study presents evidence that more independent board is positively related 
to voluntary CEO turnover, more generous severance package and larger stock option grant. 
Weisbach (1988) finds that there is a strong relationship between previous firm performance and 
the likelihood of CEO voluntary resignation for firms with more outside directors than for firms 
with more insiders on the board. They conclude that independent boards are more likely to dismiss 
poorly performing CEOs than dependent boards. 
Notwithstanding the general consensus for more independent boards, the advantage of 
which has been examined in several studies. The implication of having a more independent board 
for the CEO employment risk presents a fundamental concern especially for large companies. This 
study fills the existing gap in current research by examining the effect of board independence on 
the determinants of CEO employment risk.  In line with Fama and Jensen (1983), Weisbach (1988) 
and Laux (2008), we argue that independent boards are more effective, and independent directors 
would prefer to preserve their reputation and do what is right to the extent that they are more likely 
to replace CEOs who are not performing as expected. We therefore propose that; 
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of CEO employment risk increases with increased board 
independence.  
2.4. CEO Network 
In any aspect of economic events, connections or networks, whether socially or economically play 
a major role.  This is because networks act as an avenue for information generation. The influence 
of such social and economic networks has been addressed in the fields of economics and sociology, 
(Larcker, So and Wang, 2013). The finance and management literature has also examined 
connections through corporate board membership. The resource dependency theory emphasises 
the need for firms to have links with important and external resources in order to reduce uncertainty 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). One way that firms can benefit from external resources is through 
directors’ networks/connections, the impact of which has been related to firm performance 
(Larcker et al., 2013), firm operational efficiencies (Saeed, Belghitar and Clark, 2015), CEO 
compensation (Engelberg et al., 2013), take overs (Renneboog and Zhao, 2014), and acquisitions 
(Kramarz and Thesmar, 2013). Furthermore, the independent directors’ reputation hypothesis 
(Ferris et.al., 2003; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Fama and Jensen, 1983), argue that independent 
directors will effectively perform their functions of advising and monitoring in order to preserve 
their reputation.  Albeit the findings of existing studies, there is however neglect of how the 
networks may affect the CEO employment risk. The term CEO connectedness or network refers 
to the number of boards the CEO has served on or is currently serving on, (Larcker et al., 2013). 
Although the Higgs report (2003) in the UK corporate governance code places some restrictions 
on cross directorship, it is still common to find that directors’ interlock in the boards of UK listed 
companies. One might assume that the strength of the CEO network size might pose an advantage 
to the CEO with respect to experience, information and outside appointments. However, Liu 
(2014) suggests that connectedness significantly increases CEO turnover probability3 especially 
for poorly performing CEOs. As noted by Brickley (2003), there is no consensus with regards to 
the effect of corporate governance on CEO turnover which has opened room for more research on 
the variation and determinants of CEO turnover. Hence, Khurana (2000) suggests that rather than 
relying on the executive labour market, which could be risky and requires a great deal of discretion, 
firms would rather rely on the executive’s personal networks to assess, suitable nominees. 
Likewise, Liu (2014) asserts that the market for executives is characterised by imperfections so 
that the director’s network becomes a crucial element. This again emphasises the fact that personal 
network of the CEO has a strong role to play in determining his employment risk. 
Advocates of board room connections argue that when there is director inter-lock, there 
would be better firm performance because it reduces the cost of information acquisition. Recent 
research like Renneboog and Zhao (2014) study the effect of director networks on takeovers. Their 
results show that better connected firms are more active bidders and that when bidders and targets 
have common directors, the takeover process is quicker (reduction in negotiation time) and are 
more successful. Similarly, Rousseau and Stroup (2015) reveal that bidders tend to approach firms 
for acquisition where a current director has been a board member. Engelberg et al., (2013) study 
the effect of connection on the compensation arrangement of CEOs in the US. The study shows 
that on average, additional connection results in about $17,000 increase in total compensation. 
They argue that firms most likely to benefit from the CEOs external connection (especially poorly 
performing firms) pay the highest price for CEO network or connection. In a similar study for UK 
firms, Renneboog and Zhao (2011) establish a positive relationship between CEO compensation 
and executive networks. They assert that both direct and indirect networks result in higher 
compensation. Renneboog and Zhao (2011) however notes that, while networks may provide some 
advantages like information provision, strong networks lead to busy directors on the board which 
undermines the monitoring effectiveness of directors to the extent that it results in less CEO pay 
for performance sensitivity and higher compensation. They conclude that firms should have the 
right type of networks to balance the advantages and disadvantages of director networks. Kramarz 
and Thesmar (2013) observed similar results. In the banking industry, Battistin, Graziano, and 
Parigi, (2012) finds that boardroom connections negatively affect bank performance. The finding 
is premised on the assumption that connections increase managers’ tenure, which often leads to 
entrenchment and consequent poor firm performance. In addition, they find that connections 
reduce the turnover probability for bank managers. Nguyen (2012) examines the impact of social 
ties on the effectiveness of directors. They find that the likelihood of CEO dismissal due to poor 
performance is lower for CEOs who have social ties with a number of directors. They conclude 
that socially connected CEOs are more likely to find new and sometimes better employment after 
a forced removal.  
In light of the forgoing, we can observe that there is no conclusion as to the effect of 
executive network on various aspects of the firm. By employing a different approach in measuring 
CEO network4, we provide evidence on how CEO network affects CEO employment risk. We 
therefore propose that because director network provides a source of information to the firm and 
also, a measure of CEO experience, there should be a negative relationship between the size of a 
CEO’s network and his/her employment risk. We propose that; 
Hypothesis 3: The likelihood of CEO employment risk reduces with increasing CEO 
network. 
 
3. Data 
3.1.Sample and data source 
The data sample consists of firms making up the FTSE 350 index for the period 1997 to 2010, with 
the exclusion of financial firms. To be included in the sample, firms must have at least two 
consecutive years of information in order to determine the CEO employment risk. The information 
relating to board size, board independence and CEO network has been extracted from BoardEx. 
Firm specific financial information was extracted from Datastream. After deleting financial firms, 
and firms without corresponding BoardEx and Datastream information, the total number of firms 
in the sample amounted to157 with an unbalanced panel of 1875 firm year observations. Table 1 
below shows the variables extracted from the two data sources and their definitions. 
 
   ----------Insert Table 1 around here ----------- 
 
3.2.Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
Table 2 below shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimation process. 
From the table, we find that on average, the board size of the firms in the sample is 9, with the 
smallest board comprised of 4 directors and the largest with 25 board members. It is also observed 
that on average the proportion of independent directors to total directors is 0.49, approximately 
50%. This shows that majority of the firms making up the FTSE350 comply with the corporate 
governance code which recommends that at least 50% of the board is comprised of independent 
directors. CEOs in the sample have served on at least one other board with a maximum of 10 
boards for some CEO. For CEO tenure and age, we find that the longest serving CEO has spent 
34 years in the role with an average of 5 years. The average age of CEOs in the sample is 52 years 
with the oldest being 77 years and the youngest 34 years. For the sampled period, firms on average 
have a ROA standing at 8.8, with a minimum negative of -54.8 and a maximum of 75.  
The Pearson’s correlation matrix presented in Table 3 shows the relationship amongst the 
variables used in the estimation. We find a positive correlation between board size, board network 
and firm size. This implies that as board size increases, the group network increases, and board 
size also increases with the size of the firm. However, we find a negative correlation between board 
independence and board size. As expected, we find positive correlation between CEO tenure and 
age and a negative correlation between CEO age and firm risk.  
 
----------Insert Table 2 around here ----------- 
 
----------Insert Table 3 around here ----------- 
 
4. Model Specification  
4.1.Estimation Technique 
The data for this study is a combination of time series and cross-sectional data. The dependent 
variable for the analysis is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when employment risk 
is high and 0 otherwise. The pitfalls of a linear probability mode (LMP) necessitate the use of a 
more reliable technique. The problem with LPM is that it assumes that the dependent variable is 
a continuous variable and that the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable is 
linear. Therefore, violating the conditions of ordinary least squares (OLS) such as 
heteroscedasticity and normal distribution of errors (Guajarati, 2004), any result obtained will 
not be consistent with the assumptions of OLS. The alternative approach is the use of probit or 
logit models which are complementary and produce the same results. Previous studies like 
Gonzalez, Guzman, Pombo, and Trujillo (2015), Fiordelisi and Ricci (2014), Bushman, Dai and 
Wang (2010) and Brunello, Graziano, and Parigi (2003) have used either probit or logit models 
where the dependent variable is a dummy variable. Following Fiordelisi and Ricci (2014), we 
estimate the following Probit model; 
Pr⁡(𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘)𝑖𝑡 =⁡𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 + 
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡∑ 𝛽4
𝑛
𝑘=7 ⁡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙⁡𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Where, n= number of control variables, k=1, 2, 3 … 7 
Following Martin, Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (2013) we measure employment risk as a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if there is consecutive two-year decline in ROA 
corresponding with two-year decline in stock price or 0 otherwise. Unlike Martin et al., we have 
chosen two years because the job of the CEO has become riskier in recent years. Thus, employment 
contracts are now for one year, as against three to five years in the nineties, (BIS, 2011). Again, 
the board of directors might not fire a CEO for poor performance in one year, but a second year 
decline might lead to decisions for a change in CEO and third year decline might result in actual 
dismissal. The use of both ROA and stock price is based on the fact that they are the commonly 
used performance measure in previous research (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003; Larcker et.al., 2013). While ROA is an accounting measure of firm performance, 
stock price is market based, the combination of both gives validity to our analysis and shows that 
the decision to fire a CEO is not just based on accounting measures but also on the market 
perception of the firm’s performance which reflects in the stock price. Board size (BSize) is the 
number of directors on the board; board independence (BID) is the ratio of non-executive directors 
on the board; CEO network is the number of boards the CEO has served on. All variables are 
lagged one year. 
 
4.2.Estimation Results 
Table 4 presents the results of the estimation with the Probit model. We begin by including one 
dependent variable at a time with the last model for each panel, including all three dependent 
variables for the hypotheses and the control variables. We observe that there is very little 
collinearity in the results as the independent variables; board size, board independence and CEO 
network show minimal change in magnitude and retain their significance when included together 
in Models 3. In line with previous studies, Bushman et al (2010), for the Probit model, we report 
and interpret the marginal effects at the mean values (i.e. the partial derivative of the probit 
function with respect to the variable in question, this is analysed at the mean values of all other 
explanatory variables). We find that the marginal effect of board size on employment risk is 
positive and statistically significant at 1% across all models. It is observed that the magnitude of 
the marginal effect increases as we add the other independent variables in Model 2&3. The results 
provide support for hypothesis 1, suggesting that the likelihood of employment risk increases for 
a given increase in board size. The results are in tandem with previous research like Yermack 
(1996) and Liang et al., (2013) which find negative relationship between board size and firm 
performance. They argue that large boards are plagued with communication and coordination 
problem and such firms have increased agency cost leading to poor performance. Hence, from our 
earlier argument, poor firm performance increases the likelihood of employment risk and 
subsequent job termination.  
Regarding the second hypothesis, we propose that in line with recent corporate governance 
codes requiring boards to be independent, board independence will increase the likelihood of 
employment risk. This is because when boards are independent they are able to make objective 
decisions as regards poorly performing CEOs. But when the board is not sufficiently independent, 
a decision to fire the CEO is unlikely when he is not performing as expected because the directors 
share common compensation incentives with the executive directors. From Table 4, Models 2&3 
we find that there is a positive significant marginal effect of board independence on CEO 
employment risk.  
----------Insert Table 4 around here ----------- 
 
Particularly, from Model 3, we find that for a given level of increase in board independence, 
the z-score of CEO employment risk increases by 0.248. The results imply that CEO employment 
risk is more likely for independent boards. The evidence provides support for Hypothesis 2, which 
is in tandem with previous studies. For example, Laux (2008) shows that there is a positive 
relationship between board independence and voluntary CEO turnover. Also, Weisbach (1988) 
shows that there is a strong relationship between prior firm performance and voluntary CEO 
turnover. He argues that independent boards are more likely to dismiss poorly performing CEO. 
Taken together, the result of the hypothesis also supports the recent recommendations for more 
independent boards by various corporate governance codes and stakeholder.  
With respect to the third hypothesis, we propose that the CEO network may negatively affect 
his/her employment risk. We propose this because when CEOs have served in several boards they 
gather experience and can be a source of information provision to the firm. As argued by resource 
dependency theory (Pfeffer, and Salancik, 1978), networks serve as an avenue through which 
valuable information which could be difficult or expensive to obtain can be received From Table 
4, although the sign is negative as expected, the results are not significant. Hence we fail to provide 
evidence for hypothesis 3 in the Probit model. The insignificant results obtained could be an 
outcome of potential endogeneity problems identified in corporate governance research (Wintoki, 
Linck, and Netter, 2012). Hence, we address this endogeneity issue in the next section. 
 
4.3.Endogeneity Concerns 
Endogeneity appearing in different forms has been a source of major concerns in corporate 
governance and finance research. Endogeneity can be present in a model in the form of reverse 
causality, an omitted variable, measurement error or unobserved firm heterogeneity (Pathan and 
Faff, 2013). For example, Gonzalez et al., (2015) show that on one hand, poor firm performance 
can lead to CEO turnover, but on the other hand, CEOs having prior information about poor future 
firm performance may decide to quit their job. Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) explain the 
significance of unobserved firm characteristics and its effect on the relationship between 
ownership and performance. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) address endogeneity concerns for 
board composition. As noted by Roberts and Whited (2012) if endogeneity issues are not addressed 
they are likely to result in biased and inconsistent estimates, and therefore, it would be wrong to 
rely on such results. To resolve this issue in our model, we employ the instrumental variable probit 
estimation technique (IVPROBIT). The use of instrumental variable in probit model, requires that 
appropriate instrument(s) be added to the model. In the case of our model, we suspect that board 
size can affect employment risk through performance, such that large boards result in poor firm 
performance which makes CEO employment risk more likely. On the other end, employment risk 
may affect board size through performance so that when performance is poor, board size is likely 
to change depending on the needs of the firm. Roberts and Whited (2012) suggest that an example 
of a valid instrument is one that it is correlated with the independent variable. In order to combat 
this form of endogeneity, we identify a variable which can serve as an instrument for board size 
but is not related to CEO employment risk. In this case we use the average board group network5. 
We assume that there is a relation between the size of the board and the size of the board network. 
So that as board size increases, board group network increases. We find a positive correlation 
between board size and board group network in Table 4.  
4.4.Estimation Results for IVPROBIT 
Table 5 presents the results using the instrumental variable probit model.  We find that the marginal 
effects of the variables presented here are larger than the results presented using probit without 
addressing endogeneity. This shows that there is indeed a causal relationship between board size 
and CEO employment risk. We examine our first hypothesis that the likelihood of employment 
risk is increasing in board size. We find that for all three models board size shows a statistically 
positive significant result at 1%. This implies that for a given change in board size, the likelihood 
of CEO employment risk increases by about 0.950. The results provide support for hypothesis 1. 
When boards are large, there is usually communication and coordination problem which results in 
poor firm performance. As observed in the correlation analysis we find negative correlation 
between board size and performance (measured by ROA). The results complement previous 
research (Eisenberg et al, 1998; Yermack, 1996; Liang et al., 2013) which reveals significant 
negative relationship between board size and profitability. Pathan and Faff (2013) also establish 
similar findings for large US banks. As stated earlier poor performance increases the likelihood of 
employment termination (Kaplan and Mitton, 2012).  
Moving on to the second hypothesis; we propose that board independence measured as the 
proportion of outside directors on the board is likely to result in increased employment risk for the 
CEO. To the extent that when a board is sufficiently independent, independent directors become 
effective in monitoring the activities of the executives especially the CEO and are able to discipline 
poorly performing CEOs. Also reputational concern will motivate independent directors to 
properly monitor the activities of CEO. From Table 5, we find that there is statistically positive 
relationship between board independence and CEO employment risk providing support for 
hypothesis 2 suggesting that the likelihood of employment risk increases by 0.549 for a given 
increase in the level of board independence. This is consistent with the findings of Laux (2008) 
that board independence is positively related to voluntary CEO turnover. In addition, Weisbach 
(1988) reveals that the probability of voluntary resignation of CEOs is higher for more independent 
boards; (see also Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino, 2004). Taken together, the results for board 
independence are also in support of the recommendations of corporate governance codes for more 
independent boards. 
The last hypothesis proposes that there will be a negative relationship between CEO 
network and CEO employment risk. That is for CEOs with large network size, the probability of 
employment risk is lower. This is based on the premise that having served on different boards, 
CEOs gather experience, are equipped with more information and are therefore able to deliver 
better performance results so that it is highly unlikely that he/she would be fired.   
 
----------Insert Table 5 around here ----------- 
 
The results presented in Table 5 support this hypothesis. This is particularly interesting 
because the results for the probit estimation were not significant whereas after controlling for 
endogeneity using IV probit in Table 5, the results are now significant. As observed there is 
statistical negative marginal effect. This means that for a given increase in network size, 
employment risk drops by 0.03. The results are in agreement with those of Renneboog and Zhao 
(2014) which reveal that the board connections provide information advantage for active bidders 
and result in successful acquisitions. Also, Engelberg et al., (2013) finds that poorly performing 
firms pay more to CEOs with more connections. In the same light, Kramarz and Thesmar (2013) 
establish that highly connected firms are less likely to dismiss poorly performing CEOs. The 
results also lend support for the resource dependency theory, (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
To examine further the relationship between the likelihood of CEO employment risk and 
corporate governance mechanisms, we have included in addition to the independent variables in 
the model, a comprehensive set of control variables to minimise the effect of omitted variables. 
These control variables are also intended to capture both CEO and firm characteristics. Following 
previous studies (Gonzalez et al., 2015; Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014; Bushman et al, 2010) we 
control for performance (ROA), firm size, CEO tenure, CEO age, firm risk, leverage and CEO 
total wealth. The definitions of these variables are presented in Table 1. From Table 5, we observe 
that the effect of ROA and CEO total wealth is negative as expected. As firm performance 
increases, the likelihood of employment risk reduces. Likewise, it is highly unlikely that CEOs 
with large firm based wealth be dismissed. Firm size as expected is positive and statistically 
significant at 1%. Larger firms have more analysts following them and more media coverage so 
that employment risk increases for CEOs of large firms. Firm risk measured as the volatility of 
stock price is positive indicating that employment risk is more likely as firm risk increases. We 
also find that CEO employment risk increases in leverage, so that firms with more debts are more 
likely to dismiss poorly performing CEOs. Lastly we find that CEO age even though positive as 
expected does not determine employment risk while CEO tenure lowers the likelihood of 
employment risk. Table 5 also presents the results for Wald test of exogeneity; the results are 
significant showing that the instrument employed is valid. 
5. Robustness Tests 
To check the validity of our measure of employment risk we use an alternative method. Following 
Gonzalez et al., (2015) and Fiordelisi and Ricci, (2014) we measure employment risk as a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if a company has changed its CEO with respect to the previous year 
and 0 otherwise. The result for this new measurement is presented in Table 6. We find that the 
results are qualitatively the same indicating that the results earlier obtained in Table 5 are not 
influenced by the way employment risk is measured.  
A further robustness test is carried out by eliminating firms in the Industrials and Consumer 
services sector. We find that the industrial and consumer services sector makes up more than 50 
percent of the sample. We therefore eliminate these firms to find out if our results are driven by 
firms in the two sectors. We find that the results remain qualitatively the same. This suggests that 
the determinants of employment risk are not specific to a particular sector. Lastly, as a robustness 
check, we recomputed the average board network without the CEO network as an instrumental 
variable. This is to investigate if the inclusion of the CEO network in the board average network 
would alter the results. The results obtained remain the same; hence we can confirm that the 
exclusion of the CEO network from the group network does not undermine the results obtained 
earlier. The results of the last two robustness checks are available on request. 
 
----------Insert Table 6 around here ----------- 
6. Discussions and Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the determinants of CEO employment risk. We study CEO employment 
risk because it is a personal risk which has the potential of affecting the decisions made by the 
CEO. Prior studies suggest that the main cause of CEOs likely or actual dismissal is poor firm 
performance (Kaplan and Mitton, 2012). However, Brickley (2003) notes that there is need for 
more research on the variation and determinants of CEO turnover. This study therefore fills the 
existing gap in current research on the determinants of CEO employment risk. Unlike previous 
studies which focus on different performance measures, this study is the first to examine how 
corporate governance mechanisms determine CEO employment risk. Specifically, we find that the 
likelihood of CEO employment risk increases with increased board size. This supports the view 
that large boards often have communication and coordination problems which leads to poor firm 
performance which threatens the CEO’s employment. The results for board independence reveal 
that board independence increases the likelihood of CEO employment risk. This confirms our 
expectation that independent boards are actually effective and that they discipline poorly 
performing CEOs. The findings show support for current recommendations for independent 
boards. The results also support the agency theory for the need of an effective board. Board 
independence is an attribute of an effective board (Conheady, McIlkenny, Opong, and Pignatel, 
2015). Another plausible explanation for the result is based on the reputation hypothesis (Fich, and 
Shivdasani, 2006; Fama and Jensen, 1983) that independent directors value their reputation to the 
extent that they would effectively carry out their function as monitoring agents, so as to dismiss or 
issue warnings to CEOs for poor firm performance. The last hypothesis examines the role CEO 
networks/connections play in determining the level of employment risk. We find that as expected, 
better connected CEOs are less likely to be dismissed from their job. This is because well 
connected CEOs do have and provide needed information combined with experience, so that firm 
performance is increased and employment risk is less likely. We also show that networks provide 
important resources for the firm so that CEOs with good networks lead to better performance and 
reduce the likelihood of CEO dismissal. The results also provide support for the resource 
dependency theory. Taken together, our paper provides new evidence that apart from performance 
corporate governance mechanisms determine the CEOs employment risk.  
Our study further contributes to corporate governance research and the agency theory 
literature. The results suggest that effective boards are able to discipline CEOs when there is need 
to. Also, independent boards are more effective so that they are likely to dismiss poorly performing 
CEOs. These are also important insights to policy makers on governance mechanisms. For 
instance, large firm size does not mean boards should be large, rather, boards should comprise of 
directors who can contribute to the value of the firm. Again, boards should be made up of more 
independent directors who can effectively monitor the activities of the CEO and other executives 
for the overall benefit of the firms. Lastly, unlike recent recommendation that place restrictions on 
cross-directorship, we recommend that networks should be encouraged. As the saying goes 
“information is power”, when CEOs are connected to different organisation they can get valuable 
information that would be beneficial to the firm. We further recommend that policy makers 
alongside board of directors should consider the determinants of CEO employment risk and 
strengthen them in practice so that CEOs and other executives would focus on advancing the 
interest of shareholders and other stakeholders.  
This study has some limitations. Due to data availability, we have examined only three 
factors that determine CEO employment risk. Future studies may consider other factors aside from 
corporate governance that may determine CEO employment risk. Future research should also 
consider other personal risks that the CEO is confronted with and how they can affect other firm 
outcomes. This study is also based on FTSE350 non-financial firms. As a starting point of future 
research, financial firms can be studied and compared with non-financial firms, focusing on a more 
recent time period. Also, since corporate governance codes apply to mostly listed firms, private 
firms can be investigated to ascertain if there is any similarity in the determinants of employment 
risk in both public and private firms.  
 
Notes 
1. We do not undermine the effect of firm performance; hence we control for it in the analysis 
2. Grey directors are directors who have some form of affiliation with the firm, they are 
sometimes called affiliated directors 
3. Employment risk and turnover probability are used interchangeably 
4. CEO network is measured as the number of corporate boards a sitting CEO has served on. 
5. Board group network is measured as the sum of the networks of individual board members 
divided by the total number of board members. 
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Table 1: Variable Names, Definition and Source. 
Variables Definition Source 
Employment Risk This is calculated as a dummy 
variable indicating 1 for two years’ 
consecutive decline in stock price 
coinciding with two year decline in 
ROA and 0 otherwise 
Authors’ calculation 
Employment 
Risk Measure 
Return on 
Asset (ROA) 
This is the ratio of net income to 
total asset 
Datastream 
Stock Price The change in value of the stock 
price as at fiscal year end 
Datastream 
Board Size This is the number of directors on 
the company’s board 
Boardex 
Board Independence (BID) This is measured as the ratio of 
non-executive directors on the 
board. 
Boardex 
CEO Network Size (CEO NTW) This is the number of boards the 
CEO has served to date 
Boardex 
Board Network  This is the average number of 
boards all the directors have served 
on to date 
Boardex 
CEO Tenure The length of time that the CEO has 
been in the current role measured in 
years, 
Boardex 
CEO Age The age of the CEO in years Boardex 
CEO Total Wealth This is the sum of equity held, 
estimated value of options and 
LTIPs held 
Boardex 
Firm Size Measured as market capitalization Datastream 
Leverage The ratio of long term debt to 
capital 
Datastream 
Firm Risk This is the volatility of the stock 
price 
Datastream 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Board Size 1874 9.315 2.698 4 25 
BID 1874 0.485 0.149 0 0.929 
CEO NTW 1871 2.378 1.763 1 10 
Board Network 1874 264.385 365.102 0 3456 
ROA 1855 8.802 9.030 -54.820 75.090 
Firm Size 1856 14.032 1.612 9.582 19.163 
CEO Tenure 1873 5.481 5.525 0 34.400 
CEO Age 1867 51.799 6.300 34 77 
Firm Risk 1648 27.099 8.462 10.740 71.220 
Leverage 1752 25.052 18.483 0.000 171.440 
CEO Total wealth 1823 8.179 1.573 2.565 14.069 
Note: For variable definitions see Table 1 
 
Table 3: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix. 
 
 
VAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Board Size 1           
BID -0.044 1          
CEO NTW 0.349*** 0.154*** 1         
Board Network 0.6262*** 0.211*** 0.476** 1        
ROA -0.035** -0.055 -0.070** -0.083** 1       
Firm Size 0.588*** 0.291*** 0.443*** 0.520*** 0.099*** 1      
CEO Tenure 0.004 -0.186*** 0.014 -0.042 0.061*** -0.115*** 1     
CEO Age 0.140*** 0.008 0.223*** 0.073*** -0.057** 0.104*** 0.307*** 1    
Firm Risk -0.201*** 0.019 -0.063*** -0.121*** -0.184*** -0.300*** 0.052* -0.089*** 1   
Leverage 0.009 -0.053 0.016 -0.002 0.126*** -0.006 -0.012 -0.050* -0.004 1  
CEO Total wealth 0.063 0.080 0.034 0.092* 0.123*** 0.181*** 0.206*** -0.048* 0.089** -0.005 1 
 
Note: For variable definitions see Table 1. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 4: Estimation Results with Probit Model. 
Dependent Variable: Employment 
Risk Probit Model 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Board Size 0.193*** 0.236*** 0.238*** 
 (0.046) (0.049) (0.049) 
BID  0.245*** 0.248*** 
  (0.079) (0.079) 
CEO NTW   -0.006 
   (0.018) 
ROA -0.071*** -0.067*** -0.068*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Firm Size 0.016 0.027** 0.026** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
CEO Tenure -0.026*** -0.022** -0.021** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
CEO Age 0.122 0.112 0.116 
 (0.089) (0.089) (0.090) 
Firm Risk 0.083** 0.081** 0.083** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Leverage 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO Wealth -0.015* -0.015* -0.015* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Observations 1197 1197 1197 
 Pseudo R2 0.092 0.101 0.101 
Note: This table reports the results for the Probit model. The dependent variable is employment risk. This is measured as a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 when there is employment risk and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Table 
1. Robust Standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Estimation Results with IVProbit. 
Dependent Variable: Employment 
Risk IVPROBIT 
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) 
    
Board Size 0.919*** 0.835*** 0.950*** 
 (0.200) (0.210) (0.241) 
BID  0.500*** 0.549*** 
  (0.110) (0.117) 
CEO NTW   -0.041* 
   (0.022) 
ROA -0.037* -0.043** -0.038* 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.021) 
Firm Size 0.087*** 0.091*** 0.098*** 
 (0.022) (0.025) (0.025) 
CEO Tenure -0.021** -0.010 -0.009 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
CEO Age 0.697 0.749 0.709 
 (1.491) (1.530) (1.502) 
Firm Risk 0.074* 0.063 0.071* 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) 
Leverage 0.008* 0.001** 0.002** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO Wealth -0.015* -0.020** -0.019** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
    
Observations 1193 1193 1193 
Wald test of exogeneity 7.56*** 5.37** 5.12** 
Note: The table represents the IVProbit regression of the model. The dependent variable is employment risk. This 
is dummy variable representing 1 if there is employment risk and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in 
Table 1. The average board network has been used as instrument. The Wald test of exogeneity suggests that the 
model is endogenous and the instrument is valid. The coefficient represents the marginal effects. Robust Standard 
errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** represents significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Estimation Results with Alternative Measure of Employment Risk. (Employment 
risk equal to 1 if the company has changed CEO and 0 otherwise). 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Employment Risk 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Board Size 0.523* 0.491* 0.596* 
 (0.298) (0.267) (0.307) 
BID  0.117* 0.265* 
  (0.070) (0.136) 
CEO NTW   -0.036* 
   (0.021) 
ROA -0.026* -0.027* -0.027* 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Firm Size 0.062** 0.065** 0.070** 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) 
CEO Tenure -0.153*** -0.146*** -0.150*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.008) 
CEO Age 0.984 -0.063 -0.058 
 (1.103) (0.073) (0.072) 
Firm Risk -0.034 -0.033 -0.028 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) 
Leverage 0.042 0.014 0.012 
 (0.040) (0.011) (0.010) 
CEO Wealth 0.012** 0.010* 0.012** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1287 1287 1287 
Wald test of exogeneity 5.42** 5.39** 5.10** 
Note: The table represents robustness check using IVProbit regression of the model. The dependent variable is employment risk. This is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a company has changed its CEO with respect to the previous year and 0 otherwise. All other 
variables are defined in Table 1. The average board network has been used as instrument. The Wald test of exogeneity suggests that the 
model is endogenous and the instrument is valid. The coefficient represents the marginal effects. Robust Standard errors in parenthesis. *, 
**, *** represents significant levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
